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EQUALIZING THE PLAYING FIELD:
THE TIME HAS COME FOR SECONDARY
MEANING IN THE MAKING IN




Imagine it is opening day for your first restaurant. It has taken
months, if not years, to get to this point and you have spent a lot of
money in developing the menu, artist style, and feel for the restau-
rant. A few months after the opening of your restaurant, a compet-
ing restaurant, right down the block from your restaurant, opens its
doors; its menu and overall look are virtually indistinguishable from
your restaurant. You are left wondering what remedies, if any, you
have as a small restaurant owner. This was the case for Chef Re-
becca Charles and her Pearl Oyster Bar in New York City.'
American courts have developed doctrines to protect the rights
of businesses from unfair competition; Congress has similarly en-
acted laws to protect intellectual property rights, such as the
Lanhamn Act (The Act).' Trademarks and trade dress are commonly
used to protect a creator's work.' A trademark is defined as "any
* The author would like to thank Uche Ewelukwa, Associate Professor of Law,
University of Arkansas School of Law, for her insight and advice during the drafting
of this connent. The author is also thankful to Lindsey Pesek, J.D. 2009, University
of Arkansas School of Law, for lier patience and support (luring tiie process.
1. Pete Wells, Chef Sues Over Intellectual Property (The Menu), N.Y. TIMEs, June
27, 2007, available al lititp://www.nyt.iiies.coi/2007/06/27/nyregioi/27)earl.
htm1111.
2. Two Pesos, 1In. v). Taro Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 781 (1992) (noting that lie
uhinate test under the Lailiani Act § 43(a) "is whether the public is likely to be
deceived or conissed by the similarity oft lie descriptivei marks . . . is there a 'like-
lilood of confision"') (citations olnitted).
3. See 15 U.S.C. 1127 (2006).
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word, name, symbol, or device" used by its creator to help identify
and distinguish the creator's work.' Trade dress, as defined by the
Eleventh Circuit, "involves the total image of a product . . ." and
"include[s] features such as size, shape, color, color combinations,
texture, graphics, [and] even particular sales techniques."'
The Act was enacted by Congress to not only give protection to
registered trademarks, but also to give protection to unregistered
trademarks and trade dress.' The Act specifically states that, "[alny
person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with
any goods or services or any container or containers of goods, a
false designation of origin, or any false description or representation
... shall be liable to a civil action."' Although the Act originally gave
protection only to trademarks, the Court inherently has given the
same protection to trade dress.' Due to this protection, small res-
taurants may now petition the courts to protect their menus, style of
restaurants, and recipes.'
The Act specifies two criteria (inherent distinction or acquisi-
tion of secondary meaning) that a person or business seeking a trade
dress infringement case must satisfy before the courts will find an
infringement.'" In infringement cases, courts will usually classify the
potential trademarks as being either: "(1) generic, (2) descriptive,
(3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary [or] fanciful."" Descriptive trade dress is
the classification most litigated in the courtroom, because distinc-
tion is not achieved until secondary meaning is shown. To estab-
lish infringement for a descriptive trade dress, courts have held that
the creator must be able to show that their "trade dress has acquired
secondary meaning."'3 Secondary meaning is acquired when "the
purchasing public associates [the trade] dress with a single producer
or source rather than just with the product itself."" In the past,
many small restaurants have failed to realize that they have similar
4. Id.
5. John H Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983).
6. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000).
7. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 766 n.2 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982)).
8. Id.
9. See generally Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 763.
10. See id.
11. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). The statute states that a trademark needs to iden-
tify and distinguish the creator's goods, "including any unique products, from those
manufactured or sold by others . . . ." Id. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768; Cicena
Ltd. v. Columbia Telecommunications Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 1548 (2d Cir. 1990).
13. Cicena Ltd., 900 F.2d at 1548.
14. Id. at 1549 (citation omitted).
90 [VOL. 5:89
EQUALIZING THE PLAYING FIELD
rights to those of larger chain restaurants. As to descriptive trade
dress, achieving the classification of secondary meaning has largely
been a problem for small restaurants because it takes extensive mar-
keting and money to show a court that secondary meaning has been
established. '"
In Chef Charles' case, a former chef, Chef McFarland, who had
worked in the Pearl Oyster Bar for Chef Charles, started a compet-
ing restaurant." Chef Charles claimed that Chef McFarland copied
every aspect of her menu and restaurant style." Under the current
law for descriptive trade dress, Chef Charles will have to show that
her trade dress has acquired secondary meaning." In order to show
this, she will have to spend large amounts of money on survey and
marketing campaigns, as well as large amounts on legal fees to main-
tain the action against her competitor.'
This article discusses secondary meaning in the making, a pos-
sible alternative to help small restaurants in their fight to protect
trade dress. This possible alternative will help smaller restaurants in
their fight to protect their trade dress from unfair competition.
Secondary meaning in the making will allow small restaurants to
show that they are taking the appropriate measures to acquire sec-
ondary meaning and thereby gain protection from the court while
secondary meaning is being acquired. The issue of protecting trade
dress is becoming more important, because even small restaurants
are investing hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars to
develop their restaurants and menus, but unless extensive money is
spent on surveying and marketing, courts may not find secondary
meaning.2" Also, many small restaurant owners have simply been
ignoring their rights when it comes to protecting their restaurants,
because many owners have felt that they never had any remedies
available to them.2' Tim Wu, a professor at Columbia School of
Law, has described this issue as "a classical marriage between food
and law."12
The test now imposed requires a restaurant to show its product
or descriptive mark is inherently distinctive or that secondary mean-
15. See generallV Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc. 698 F.2d 786 (5th
Cir. 1983).
16. See Wells, supra note 1.
17. Id.
18. See Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. at 205.
19. See Zatarains, Inc. 698 F.2d at. 786.
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ing has been acquired." This article suggests that courts use an al-
ternative secondary meaning test to protect small restaurants from
having to show secondary meaning while they are trying to meet the
requirements for it, because the test now used by the courts is overly
burdensome on small restaurants.
II. OVERVIEW OF HISTORY OF TRADEMARKS AND TRADE DRESS
American courts and legislatures have developed a system of
trademark and trade dress laws to protect the distinctive logos and
names of businesses from their competitors." Congress established
the Lanham Act" (The Act) to protect trademarks, but courts have
held that the Act also provides similar protection to trade dress."
Even though Congress and the courts have been provided protec-
tion for trademarks" and trade dress" they have yet to adopt a stan-
dard that will adequately protect small restaurants while also pro-
tecting the consuming public and other companies against unfair
competition.
A. History of Trademarks
A trademark, defined by Congress, is, "any word, name, sym-
bol, or devise, or any combination thereof, used by a person, or
which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce . . . to
identify and distinguish his or her goods." Enacted in 1946, the
original Lanham Act was narrowly interpreted by the Supreme
Court to protect against "false description or representation.""o The
statute was originally read narrowly so that it only prevented "false
advertising and the common-law tort of 'passing off."" The Court,
however, started to read the statute more broadly and The Act be-
gan to be used as a tool to protect against unfair competition."
23. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 763.
24. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 767-68.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
26. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 776.
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
28. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 763, 776.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
30. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 778 (citation omitted).
31. Id. The Court stated that the tort of passing off was construed in American
and English common law as one who passes "off his goods as the goods of an-
other." Id. at 779.
32. Id. at 779.
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The language of The Act is broad, allowing many things to qual-
ify as a trademark. The Supreme Court held that Section 43(a)(1) of
The Act protects product symbols and even colors." The Court's
new interpretation of Section 43(a)(1) has made it so that many
things may qualify as a trademark under The Act, since people may
associate a business with more than just its name."
The four categories of trademarks' are guidelines and advisory
in their use, but have been difficult to apply." A "generic" term de-
scribes more of the basic nature of an article or service "rather than
the more individualis[tic] characteristics of a particular product."3
These types of marks/terms/logos are unable to gain trademark
protection." Furthermore, if a registered trademark ever becomes
generic, its registration is subject to cancellation."' An example of a
generic term is "aspirin.""
A "descriptive" term is one that "identifies a characteristic or
quality of an article or service."" These terms are usually not pro-
tectable as trademarks; however, they may gain protection through
the assertion that the trade dress is inherently distinctive" or by
showing secondary meaning." An example of a descriptive term is
"aloe" when used in "reference to products containing gel of the
aloe vera plant."" The difference "between generic and descriptive
terms is one of degree" but it is an important distinction, because
33. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (holding that
"[B]oth the language of the Act and the basic underlying principles of trademnark
law would seem to include color within the universe of things that can qualify as a
trademark").
34. Id. at 162. "Since human beings might use as a 'symbol' or 'device' almost
anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this language, read literally, is
not restrictive." Id. The Court still required that the creator show that the trade
dress color has esiablished the necessary secondary meaning for a descriptive trade
dress. Id at 163.
35. Zatarain, Inc., 698 F.2d at 790 (noting the four categories as 1) generic; 2)
descriptive; 3) suggestive; l) arbitrary or fanciful).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
39. See id.
40. Zatarains, Inc., 698 F.2d a. 790.
4 1. Id. (citation omnitted).
12. See generally Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 763.
43. Zatarains, Inc., 698 F.2d at 790.
11. See generally id. (citing Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Milvan, Inc., 423 F.2d
845 (5th I Cir. 1970)).
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generic terms never gain protection but descriptive terms may gain
protection."
A "suggestive" term is one that by its very nature "suggests,
rather than describes some particular characteristic of the goods or
services [that] it applies and requires the consumer to exercise
[their] imagination ... to draw a conclusion as to the nature of the
goods and services."" Suggestive marks are inherently distinctive
and are protected without the showing of secondary meaning." An
example is the term "Coppertone" when in reference to the sun-
screen product."
"Arbitrary or fanciful terms bear no relationship to either the
product or services to which they . . . appl[y]."" These terms are
protectable without the showing of secondary meaning, because
they "bear no relationship to the product or service."" An example
is the term "Kodak" when referring to photographic supplies."
The purpose behind the Act is to protect the public from deceit
and companies against unfair competition." Even though there is
protection for small restaurants in trademarks, most restaurants
have tried to protect their menus and restaurant styles by a cause of
action for trade dress infringement, due to findings that menus and
restaurant styles are not patentable." Even a showing of trade dress
infringement has been a hard barrier to overcome for small restau-
rants, because of the high secondary meaning standard that the
courts require all businesses to show.' This standard seems to go
against the inherent purpose of the Act to protect against unfair
competition."
45. Zatarains, Inc., 698 F.2d at 790-91.
46. Id. at 791 (italics in original).
47. Id.
48. See id. (citing Douglas Laboratories, Inc. v. Copper Tan, Inc., 210 F.2d 453 (2nd
Cir. 1954)).
49. Zatarains, Inc., 698 F.2d at 791.
50. Id.
51. See id. (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Weil, 243 N.Y.S. 319 (1930)).
52. S.Rep. No. 1333, 79"' Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1946). The Senate Report stated
that the Act has two goals: 1) to protect the public, so they know what they are
buying; and, 2) the owner of the trademark is protected in their investment. Id.
53. Buca, Inc. v. Gambucci's, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (D. Kansas 1998) (holding
that the trade dress did not meet the secondary meaning standard); Two Pesos, Inc.,
505 U.S. at 763 (holding that trade dress which is inherently distinctive need not
show secondary meaning).
54. Buca, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d at 1193.
55. See S.Rep. No. 1333, supra note 52.
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B. The History of Trade Dress
Trade dress was designed to give protection against unfair
competition.' Trade dress is defined as anything that involves "the
total image of the business . . . include[ing] the . . . floor plan [to] . .
. the menu" and dress of the servers."5 To prove trade dress in-
fringement the plaintiff must establish three elements: 1) that there
is a likelihood of confusion among the consuming public; 2) "the
appropriated features of the trade dress are nonfunctional";" and, 3)
the creator must be able to show that the trade dress is distinctive."
The creator can choose one of two ways to show that their trade
dress is distinctive; either by showing inherent distinctiveness or by
proving that their trade dress "has acquired distinctiveness through
secondary meaning.""
1. Secondary Meaning
Secondary meaning is used commonly to indicate that the
trademark or trade dress has come, through use, to be associated
with a specific source." The Supreme Court has held that in an ac-
tion about descriptive trade dress a small business owner must be
able to show that product design has acquired secondary meaning in
order to receive protection under The Act."' In a case about trade
dress, a creator may show that their distinctive mark is inherently
distinct to avoid having to show secondary meaning."
"Proof of secondary meaning requires vigorous evidentiary re-
quiremuents.""' Relevant factors to prove secondary meaning include:
"advertising expenditures, sales success, length and exclusivity of
use, unsolicited media coverage, and consumer studies.""' This evi-
dentiary showing is a problem for small restaurants with a limited
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
57. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 763 (citing Blue Bell Bio Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc.
864 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1989)).
58. Ingrida Karins Berzins, The Emerging Circuit Spilt over Secondary Meaning in
Trade Dress Law, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1661, 1666 (2001) (citations omitted).
59. Id.
60. Id.; Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 769.
61. REsTATEMENT (THIRn) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 Cnit. e (Tentative Diaft
No. 2, 1990) (noting that a source could be a person's goods, services, or business).
62. Samara Brothers, Inc. 529 U.S. at 206.
63. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 776.
61. Thompson Medical Co., Inc. v. fizer Ic., 753 F.2d 208, 217 (2nd Cir. 1985)
(citation onitted).
65. Cicena I./d., 900 F.2d at 1551.
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budget for advertising and a limited amount of product sold. To
prove secondary meaning, companies must show that they have
spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on advertising and that their
volume of sales is substantial.'
Recently, the Supreme Court has started to apply different sec-
ondary meaning standards. In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
the Court held that product packaging could be inherently distinct;
however, if the trade dress is found to be descriptive then secondary
meaning will still be required." In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
Brothers, Inc., the Court held that in product design cases the creator
must be able to show secondary meaning to meet the requirement
of distinctiveness because product design cannot be inherently dis-
tinct." Both these decisions impact trade dress infringement cases
by requiring owners of product design trade dress to show secon-
dary meaning but allowing owners of inherently distinctive products
to avoid having to show secondary meaning." Some lower courts
have tried to protect creators of trade dress by using alternatives to
the secondary meaning requirement.
2. Secondary Meaning in the Making
Secondary meaning in the making re-emerged in the case of
The National Lampoon, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc." Cases
have defined the doctrine of secondary meaning "in the making" to
provide where secondary meaning has not yet developed, a "trade
dress will [still] be protected against intentional [or] deliberate at-
tempts to capitalize on a distinctive product."7 1
The purpose behind the doctrine is to protect the creator
against unfair competition because they have spent money on sec-
ondary meaning but have yet to fully acquire the necessary require-
ments for secondary meaning.72 A New York court held that secon-
66. Zatarains, Inc., 698 F.2d at 795 (holding that Zatarains met their burden of
proof by showing that they had spent $ 400,000 on advertising during the period of
1976 and 1981, and by showing that their sales from 1964 through 1979 were
$ 916,385).
67. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 763 (holding that if trade dress is inherently dis-
tinctive then there is no need to show secondary meaning).
68. Samara Brothers, Inc. 529 U.S. at 206.
69. Id.; Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 776.
70. 376 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
71. Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 313,
316 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
72. Cicena Ltd., 900 F.2d at 1549.
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dary meaning in the making should protect a mark against people
with actual knowledge or at least "good reason to know of its poten-
tial . . ." "or against someone intent on capitalizing on the quality of
the mark."7 ' The court went on to add that piracy should not be
tolerated any more "in the earlier stages of development . . . than
in its later stages.
Secondary meaning in the making has had a hostile response;
many courts have decided not to broaden the doctrine of secondary
meaning to include it." The Second Circuit, in Cicena Ltd. v. Colum-
bia Telecommunications Group, held that the circuit would not accept
the doctrine because The Act only protected against "false designa-
tion of origin", so any product that had not acquired secondary
meaning could not designate an origin." The court went on to add
that allowing a case to proceed without the showing of secondary
meaning "would undermine the ... purpose of" The Act, because it
would not "show that the public associates the product with a source
"77
Another major reason that courts choose not to endorse the
doctrine is because most of the cases before the courts have either
met the requirements for secondary meaning or have lacked the
facts to support a finding of secondary meaning in the making.
Even though the Second Circuit has denied accepting the doctrine
of secondary meaning, the court did state that the doctrine serves an
admirable goal by "preventing the deliberate copier from capitaliz-
ing on the efforts of the [creator].""
Many scholarly criticisms exist for the doctrine of secondary
meaning in the making, and look to abandon the doctrine as a
whole."" One of the major problems that many legal scholars have
with the doctrine is the thought that it "is inimical to the purpose of
73. Loctite Corp. v. National Starch and Chemical Corp., 516 F. Supp. 190, 211
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
74. Id.
75. Cicena Ld., 900 F.2d at. 1519.
76. Id. at 1550 (explaining that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit decided that the Second Circuit would agree witi the holding as the
issue was one of first impression in the Second Circuit but decided by the Federal
Circuit).
77. Id.
78. Id.; see generally Scholastic, Inc. v. MacMillian, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Loctite Corp., 516 F. Supp. at 2 10.
79. Id. at 1550.
80. Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: A Oveniiew, 31 UCLA L. REv. 131, 1374
(1987). "There is a notion at large called secondary meaning in the making. I.
should be stamped out." Id.
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. . . secondary meaning . . . ."" One criticism that arose from the
scholarly debate is that arguing for an underdeveloped doctrine
such as secondary meaning in the making would allow courts to dis-
pense with the requirements of secondary meaning." However, the
main concern over applying the doctrine of secondary meaning in
the making is that the courts could be giving protection to trade
dress that might not otherwise be protectable."
3. Tort of Passing Off
Another action that is available to an owner of a trade dress is
the common law action of passing off. Passing off occurs when per-
son A tries to sell person B's products under the name or mark of
person A.' Express passing off is when one company "labels its
goods or services . . . identical to another" company's or when a
company deliberately "misrepresents the origin of the" product.'
Implied passing off is when competitor A uses its advertising mate-
rials to imply that competitor A is making the product, although the
product is made by competitor B."
Even though this cause of action is available to the small restau-
rant owner, it requires them to show that the competitor intended
to pass off their product as the competitors own." When a cause of
action is brought under The Act, the intent of the competitor is not
required.' If a small restaurant owner could combine the common
law tort of passing off with secondary meaning in the making it
would greatly increase the chance of protection because even if the
owner could not prove the intent of their competitor they would still
only have to show that they were in the process of gaining secondary
meaning to gain protection. If secondary meaning in the making is
not available, then the small restaurant owner will either have to
show intent of the competitor or that secondary meaning has been
acquired.
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 Cnt. e (Tentative Draft
No. 2,1990).
82. John M. Scagnelli, Dawn of a New Doctrine? Trademark Protection for Incipient
Secondary Meaning, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 527 (1981).
83. Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1374, 1377-1378.




88. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
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4. Recent Developments
Recent trade dress cases have given the same protection to
trade dress as registered trademarks." Even with this protection for
trade dress, small restaurants still have a hard time securing trade
dress protection when courts require a showing of secondary mean-
ing."' The Act does not state that cases alleging trade dress in-
fringement must show secondary meaning, but the Supreme Court
has held that secondary meaning or distinctiveness have become a
universal standard." Courts offer protection for trade dress only if
the trade dress meets the standards of a qualifying mark under The
Act, which requires a showing of secondary meaning unless the
trade dress is inherently distinct."' Therefore, secondary meaning
has long been held a factor necessary to acquire protection in trade
dress infringement cases.
III. ANALYSIS
If trade dress is inherently distinct, then the owner does not
have to show that it has acquired secondary meaning for protec-
tion." The Two Pesos decision has not cleared up the confusion that
has been imposed by the secondary meaning requirement, espe-
cially when a small restaurant is trying to enforce its trade dress
rights. Courts continue to address secondary meaning for trade
dress differently."' Until the courts adopt a uniform ruling or alter-
native requirement for small businesses, small restaurant owners will
continue to be unsuccessful when trying to protect their trade
dress."
A. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.
The Two Pesos case arose when a Mexican restaurant chain sued
another Mexican restaurant chain for trade dress infringement un-
89. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 776 (1992).
90. See Iuca, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d at 1208.
91. Samara Brothers, Inc. 529 U.S. at 210-211.
92. Id.
93. 7Too Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 776.
91. Samara Brothen, Inc., 529 U.S. at 206 (holding that in cases where product.
design is trying to be protected as an unregistered trade dress, secondary meaning
Iust be established).
95. See Sanara Brothen, Inc., 529 U.S. 205.
96. See Wells, supra note 1, at A1.
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der the Act." The trial court instructed the jury that Two Pesos had
to prove that its trade dress was inherently distinctive, or that it had
acquired secondary meaning in order to uphold its action for trade
dress infringement." The court of appeals upheld the trial court's
finding that the trade dress was distinctive but had not acquired the
necessary secondary meaning. to qualify for a trade dress infringe-
ment action."
The Supreme Court reiterated the basis for the Act, which was
to protect businesses against unfair competition.'" The Court held
that the rule regarding trade dresses distinctiveness was clear: the
mark needed to be inherently distinctive or have its distinctiveness
acquired through secondary meaning and the plaintiff need not
have to show both."o' The Court took a dramatic step by holding
that plaintiffs only needed to show inherent distinctiveness or sec-
ondary meaning. The Court's decision has made it easier for busi-
nesses to protect their trade dress, since they no longer have to
show both inherent distinctiveness and secondary meaning."
The Court has shown "a trend of [giving] broader protection"
to a company's trade dress/trademark,o' but this has not always
been the case for small businesses. Some owners still have difficulty
showing inherent distinctiveness or secondary meaning because
their trade dress may be seen as generic." The marks cannot be
merely descriptive, because they may only become protected under
The Act if the descriptive marks "become distinctive of the [com-
pany's] goods in commerce."'o The ultimate test "is whether the
public is likely to be deceived or confused by the similarity of the
marks" or dress.'0
The Court in Two Pesos held that inherently distinctive trade
dress was protectable even though it had not acquired secondary
meaning.' Some scholars interpret the holding in Two Pesos to es-
97. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. 765.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 767-768.
100. Id. at 767.
101. Id. at 769 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 (tenta-
tive draft No. 2, 1990)).
102. David Gurnick, Intellectual Property in Franchising: A Survey of Today's Domes-
tic Issues, 20 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 347, 361 (1995).
103. Id. at 362.
104. See Buca, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d at 1199-1202.
105. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 769.
106. Id. at 783 (Stevens, J., concurring).
107. Id.
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tablish the foundation of the secondary meaning in the making doc-
trine."" The rationale for the secondary meaning in the making doc-
trine is to protect the creator of trade dress, who has spent money
and effort in creating good will and consumer association, from un-
fair competition, thus allowing additional time to meet the require-
ments for secondary meaning.' The Court made a dramatic step,
and by doing so helped small restaurants by applying a rationale
interpreted by some scholars to support the secondary meaning in
the making doctrine. However, the Court failed to explicitly state
secondary meaning in the making as a possible alternative that small
restaurants may use as a tool to protect their trade dress. Accord-
ingly, there continues to be debate over the validity of the doc-
trine.'"'
B. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.
The Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos was limited to
product packaging and did not apply in cases involving product de-
sign.'" The Samara Bros. Court noted that "distinguishing Two Pesos
[might] force [lower] courts to draw [a] difficult line between prod-
uct-design and product-packaging trade dress.""' However, "the
difficulty of having to distinguish between [the two] will be much
less than the frequency and difficulty of having to decide when a
product design is inherently distinctive.""
Samara Brothers, a designer and manufacturer of children's
clothing, brought an action against Wal-Mart for selling "knock-offs"
of its clothing line for a reduced price."' Samara Brothers won at
trial and the court of appeals upheld the trial court's findings."' The
Supreme Court reiterated its holding from Two Pesos by stating that
"distinctiveness Iwas a] prerequisite for registration of [a] trade
dress . . . .""; Product design is never inherently distinctive.'"
108. Wilaijeanne F. McLean, The Birth, Death and Renaissance of The Doctrine of
Secondary Meaning in the Making, 12 Am. U. L. Rev. 737, 771 (1993).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 757.
111. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. al 206.
112. Id.
113. Id.
I l1. Id. at 207-08.
115. Id. at 208.
116. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. at 210.
117. Id. al 213.
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The fact that product design almost invariably serves purposes other
than source identification not only renders inherent distinctiveness
problematic; it also renders application of an inherent-distinctiveness
principle more harmful to other consumer interests.
The Samara Bros. Court distinguished the Two Pesos decision by
holding that restaurant decor was not a product design, but was
more like product-packaging, which does not require secondary
meaning if there is inherent distinctiveness."' The Court went one
step further, holding that if lower courts were confused as to which
test should be applied, then they "should err on the side of . . .
product design" and apply the secondary meaning standard."'
The Samara Bros. decision raised the bar and narrowed the
Court's protection of trade dress. Now, creators either have to show
that their trade dress is product packaging, requiring only a showing
inherent distinctiveness or if trade dress is categorized as product
design, creators must show proof that secondary meaning has been
acquired.'' This test has confused many federal courts that are now
trying to figure out which test they should apply.'"
Samara Bros. could have drastic results for small restaurant
owners seeking trade dress protection. The small restaurant owner
must first distinguish whether they are dealing with a product pack-
aging infringement or a product design infringement. Next, the
small restaurant owner will have to determine how courts in their
jurisdiction are applying the standards set out from the Two Pesos
and Samara Bros. decisions, since there is now a court split between
the two decisions.' If these decisions are not properly applied at
the trial level the small restaurant owner may lose any chance for
trade dress protection, or they could find themselves in a continuing
legal battle."'
118. Id.
119. Id. at 215.
120. Id.
121. See generally id.
122. Ingrida Karins Berzins, The Emerging Circuit Spilt over Secondary Meaning in
Trade Dress Law, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1661, 1672 (2004).
123. See Generally Ingrida Karins Berzins, The Emerging Circuit Spilt, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 1661.
124. See generally Fuddrckers, Inc. v. Doc's BR Others, Inc. 826 F.2d 837 (9th Cir.
1987)
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C. Examples of the Confusion in Restaurant Trade Dress
Infingement Cases
1. Buca, Inc. v. Gambucci's, Inc.
In this case, Buca, a Minnesota restaurant, sought to enjoin
Gambucci, a Kansas restaurant, from featuring particular d6cor
elements that they claimed were protected trade dress."' Buca
claimed that excess was a key to their restaurant decor.'" It used
excess in the amount of pictures and art objects that hung on the
wall, and the velour drapes found in the restaurant.2 ' Buca claimed
that the items found in the restaurant were "normally found in an
Italian restaurant."'"2 The d6cor was used in a non-traditional man-
ner to make customers feel like they were in a Southern Italian res-
taurant in the 1940's or 1950's.'" Buca's restaurant was also fea-
tured in many restaurant magazines from around the country. "
Gainbucci's restaurant also was designed to look like a Southern
Italian restaurant from the 1940s or 1950s."' The Director of New
Concepts for Gambucci's made several trips to Buca's to conduct
research ideas for a Southern style Italian Restaurant, but the direc-
tor also made trips to several other Italian restaurants around the
country.' 2 The architect for Gambucci's restaurant testified that he
received no instructions from the owners and based the concept of
the restaurant from a play and a theme park he visited in Florida.'"
In this action, "Buca inaintain[ed] that its trade dress [was]
'suggestive'," thus it required no showing of secondary meaning,
"because 'it requireledl the use of customer . . . imagination as to
the" specific nature of the restaurant.' Gambucci argued that the
trade dress was merely gencric, which is always unprotected." The
judge ruled that the product was not inherently distinctive merely
because the two restaurants looked exactly the same."' The judge
125. Iuca, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d at 196.




130. Iura, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d at, 1197.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1198.
134. Id. al 1203.
135. Iuca, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d at 1203.
136. Id.
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held that the trade dress was descriptive and not suggestive, thus
requiring Buca to show secondary meaning.'"
"Consumer testimony ... advertising ... unsolicited media cov-
erage ... exclusivity . . . sales success, and . .. intentional copying
... were several factors the court used to determine whether sec-
ondary meaning had been acquired.'" The judge ruled that even
though Buca's restaurant had received plentiful media coverage, it
did not mean that the restaurant was well known in the area for it to
have acquired secondary meaning.'" Buca also tried to show that it
had acquired secondary meaning by using its trade dress for the
statutory period,o but just because it had acquired secondary mean-
ing in one place does not mean that it has acquired it in another
remote location."' This case represents a primary problem for small
restaurants, which may be able to protect their trade dress in a
closely located spot but not in a location that is farther away.
This case further illustrates the utter confusion in trade dress
litigation involving restaurants. In the Buca case, the court followed
the factors that were required for product design cases,"' although it
seemed that Buca's trade dress was product packaging similar to that
found in Two Pesos,"' which would have allowed it to show inherent
distinctiveness and avoid having to showing proof of secondary
meaning."' On the other hand, to avoid this confusion, if secondary
meaning in the making was a possible alternative for Buca it could
have shown that they were taking steps, through marketing and sur-
veys, to acquire secondary meaning and therefore should receive
protection from the courts while engaged in this process. Allowing
Buca to show secondary meaning in the making would not have a
chilling effect on the market because it would help to elicit new
product designs and foster competition."' Secondary meaning in
the making would allow inventors to protect their trade dress
against piracy throughout its entire phase of creation and not just
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1204.
139. Id. at 1205.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006).
141. Buca, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d at 1205-06 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2000)).
142. See id. at 1204.
143. See generally Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
144. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. at 214-15.
145. Daniel J. Gifford, The Interplay of Product Definition, Design and Trade Dress, 75
MINN. L. REV. 769, 786 (1991).
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when the product is complete and has acquired full secondary
meaning.'
2. Rainforest Caf, Inc. v. Amazon, Inc.
In 1992, a small restaurant called the Amazon Bar and Grill
opened in Santa Monica, California."' The opening of the Amazon
Bar and Grill was nationally televised on the E (Entertainment) Net-
work and in 1993 the second Amazon Bar and Grill opened in Los
Angeles, California, again covered on national television.""' The
Rainforest Caf6 (Rainforest) was designed in 1979, but did not ma-
terialize into a restaurant until October 3, 1994.'"
Amazon Bar and Grill brought a claim for trade dress in-
fringement against the Rainforest in Minnesota.'" Rainforest then
filed a motion for summary judgment.'"' The court first concluded
that the rainforest theme of the restaurants was functional, because
the Act only serves to protect non-functional trade dress, but that
the core concept of the rainforest theme was not protected under
the Act because it would discourage others from using any type of
rainforest theme.12 The court held unless Amazon Bar and Grill can
show inherent distinctiveness it would have to show that its restau-
rant style had acquired secondary meaning.'"
Amazon Bar and Grill tried to show that its restaurant style was
inherently distinct to avoid having to show secondary meaning.'
The court, in its determination of inherent distinctiveness, held that
the issue is not about the impact of the trade dress on the consumer
but rather on the arbitrariness of the trade dress and its relevance to
the product thus taking away consumer association, a key part of
The Act.'55
When applying the distinctiveness test, the court found a genu-
ine issue of fact as to whether the elements composing the rainforest
theme created by the Amazon Bar and Grill were dictated by a
146. Id.
147. Rainforest Cafr, Inc. v. Amazon, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 886, 890 (1). Minn. 1999).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 890, 892.
150. Id. at 892-93.
151. Id.
152. Rainforest Cafi, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 891.
153. Id. at 895.
151. Id. at 896.
155. Id. (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Ilunting World. Inc., 53 7 F.2d 4, 9 (2d
Cir. 1976)).
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common rainforest design or whether Amazon's trade dress was
unique and unusual in the field thus making it inherently distinct.'"
Amazon survived summary judgment but still has a high standard to
meet, because they must show that their rainforest theme is unique
and not part of a common design.' If Amazon is unable to do this
then they must show that their rainforest theme has acquired secon-
dary meaning.
Amazon, as a small restaurant chain, is faced with the difficult
position of showing that its trade dress is unique from a general rain
forest theme.'" This could be difficult because Amazon may have
inherent distinctiveness to the locality, in which it located, but the
court will look to a broader area. Since the case is in Minnesota it is
unlikely that Amazon will be able to show that its trade dress is dis-
tinct from Rainforest even though they may look entirely similar.'"
The Amazon Bar and Grill would likely receive protection if it could
prove to the court that it has acquired secondary meaning in the
making through their preliminary marketing and survey data. Al-
lowing Amazon Bar and Grill to show secondary meaning in the
making would promote the goals of The Act by impeding unfair
competition and protecting a creator from unfair competitors while
they are achieving secondary meaning.' The court in its decision
also seemed confuse the standards of secondary meaning and unfair
competition by ignoring the association the product has with its
consumers, and this is an important part of the secondary meaning
standard that has been used by the courts.''
D. A New Approach for Courts When Deciding Trade Dress
Infringement Issues for Small Restaurants
After the Two Pesos and Samara Bros. decisions, courts have de-
veloped a split when deciding trade dress infringement cases be-
cause of the confusion in the Supreme Court's opinions.' Small
restaurants are just one of the many small businesses that have been
adversely affected by the courts confusion and inconsistency in this
area. Small restaurants do not have the time or money to gamble as
156. Id. at 896-97.
157. See Rainforest Caf, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 896-897.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 886.
160. McLean, The Birth, Death and Renaissance of The Doctrine of Secondary Meaning
in the Making, 42 AM. U. L. REV. at 771.
161. Rainforest Caf, Inc, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 896.
162. Berzins, The Emerging Circuit Spilt, 152 U. PA. L. REV. at 1672.
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to which standard the court is going to apply in their trade dress
infringement cases, but their business usually depends on having
their trade dress defended by the courts."
The courts should follow the underlying rationale in Two Pesos,
which stated that where inherent distinctiveness is found in cases
involving product packaging, secondary meaning is not needed.'"
In Two Pesos, the Court's decision has been interpreted by some
scholars to resound the doctrine of secondary meaning in the mak-
ing." The use of this doctrine could protect small restaurant own-
ers who are in the works of acquiring secondary meaning. If the
courts do not give this protection then many small restaurant own-
ers could spend vast amounts of money on their restaurants, but if
they have not yet acquired secondary meaning the courts will give
no protection unless the owner can prove another cause of action
like the common law tort of passing off."" However, the tort of pass-
ing off requires that the owner be able to show the intent of the
competitor, which could be a difficult barrier for the owner to prove
in court.
In Samara Bros., the Court reinstated secondary meaning in
cases that involve product design, but the Court did not effectively
define when a case was a product design case or a product packag-
ing case."" To avoid confusion and undue prejudice, courts should
loosen the secondary meaning requirements and not force small
restaurants to show that they have acquired secondary meaning, but
have the restaurants show that they are in the process of acquiring
secondary meaning through secondary meaning in the making.
The purpose of The Act is to prevent unfair competition and
protect consumers." Secondary meaning in the making will give
small restaurant owners a fighting chance against competing larger
restaurant chains that come into the small restaurants area and steal
the restaurants style and menu and then market it nationally without
compensating the small restaurant owner. Also, secondary meaning
in the making will not have a chilling effect on the small restaurant
market, but will encourage restaurant owners to readily develop new
163. See Wells, supra note 1, at Al, AIG.
161. See generally Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. 763.
165. McLean, The Birth, Death and Renaissance of The Dorlrine of Secondary Meaning
in the Making, 12 AM. U. L. REv. at 771.
166. See Wells, supra note 1.
167. See generally Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205.
168. See S.Rep. No. 1333, suir nole 55. The Senate Report stated ihat the Act
has two goals: 1) to protect the public, so they know what they are buying; 2) the
owner of the trademark is protected in their investment. Id.
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trade dress without the fear that their new ideas will be stolen and
used against them.' Secondary meaning in the making will protect
consumers by placing confidence in them that they are purchasing
the products from the owner of the trade dress.7 o
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has various approaches to
dealing with trade dress infringement cases."' In some cases, all that
a creator of trade dress needs to prove is that their product has be-
come inherently distinct and the court will use the Lanham Act (the
Act) to protect the owners trade dress.'" In other cases, the Court
will require a creator to show that their trade dress has acquired
secondary meaning in order for it to receive protection under the
Act.' This confusing circuit split does little to protect small restau-
rant owners.'71
In order for small businesses, especially small restaurants, to
protect their trade dress it is time for the Court to apply an alterna-
tive secondary meaning standard, so that small restaurants may sur-
vive in the modern competitive market. The Court took the right
step in Two Pesos,'7 but failed to help small businesses by ignoring
any further alternatives to the secondary meaning standard. The
Court further digressed from clearing up any confusion when it de-
cided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.,'" and held that in
cases involving product design, owners would have to show secon-
dary meaning and seemed to sidestep the rationale it used in Two
Pesos. 7
Secondary meaning in the making, while controversial, is the
appropriate route for the courts to take to ensure that small restau-
169. McLean, The Birth, Death and Renaissance of The Doctrine of Secondary Meaning
in the Making, 42 AM. U. L. REV. at 771.
170. Secondary meaning in the making has not developed a standard to use when
deciding whether the creator has taken enough necessary steps to receive protec-
tion from the courts. This article does not suggest what standard a court should
use in deciding whether there is secondary meaning in the making, but instead
advocates the initial position that an alternative to secondary meaning needs to be
considered by the courts to protect small restaurants.
171. See generally Samara Brothers, Inc. 529 U.S. 205; Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. 763.
172. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. 763.
173. See Samara Brothers, Inc. 529 U.S. 205.
174. See generally Wells, supra note 1.
175. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. 763.
176. See Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205.
177. See id.
108 [VOL. 5:89
2009] EQUALIZING THE PLAYING FIELD 109
rants are protected against unfair competition and that consumers
are protected, so that they know that the product they are buying is
coming from a trusted source.

